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1 Context & Time-and-Level-of-Use pricing
The increase in stochastic power generation from wind and solar systems has highered the
variability of supply in modern grids, along with a diminished guaranteed generation. Demand
Response tackles this challenge by creating incentive for demand-side decision-makers to modify
their consumption profile. We leverage the Time-and-Level-of-Use (TLOU) pricing policy to
gain guarantee on energy demand of a large number of consumers, which corresponds to the fact
that deviations from announced consumptions yield an increase in prices for the consumers.
The TLOU pricing was introduced in [2], built as an extension of Time-of-Use, used to create
incentives to shift or reduce consumption. The goal of TLOU are to extend TOU by allowing
users to signal back their consumption intention. The tariff consists in a booking fee K, a lower
energy price function πL(c) and a higher energy price function πH(c). In the variant developed
in [1], the whole energy consumed during the time frame is billed at either the lower or higher
tariff. For a given time frame, the client books a capacity ahead of time. If the energy they
consume during the time frame remains below the announced capacity, they are billed at the
lower price, if it is above, they pay the higher price.
2 Price-setting as a bilevel optimization problem
We consider the problem of optimally setting the components of the pricing policy from a
supplier perspective. The decision is cast as a bilevel problem modeling a Stackelberg or leader-
follower game. The random consumption of each client is represented as a mixed continuous-
discrete probability distribution. The supplier, acting as the leader of the game chooses the
price components before announcing them to the consumers, who then react by choosing a
capacity minimizing their expected cost. Starting from a general formulation of the leader’s
decision, we reduce the problem to an equivalent single-level MINLP by exploiting the structure
of the follower cost function, deriving a finite set of second-level optimality candidates. The
non-linear problem is then linearized using regularity conditions and reformulation of co-linear
terms. The problem structure is leveraged to derive a solution method based on row generation.
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